The Principles of Prevention

DEFENSE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE
DIRECTORATE OF RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

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Disclaimer:

The intent of this report is to provide guidance for the development of harassment prevention initiatives. As prevention research continues to advance and improve, methodologies for the identification and mitigation of harassment, this report will adapt accordingly. The Principles of Prevention strategy is not intended to serve as a replacement for other existing strategies or analyses but is intended to work in conjunction with other evidence-based approaches toward the overall prevention of harassment.

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this report is to support the integration of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) guiding principles of prevention and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office's (SAPRO) Prevention Plan of Action (PPOA) into the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) curriculum for Equal Opportunity (EO) professionals. This document details the modified Principles of Prevention (PoP) by outlining the four steps, defining the risk domains, and summarizing extensive research on the risk and protective factors affecting the harassing behaviors listed in the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1020.03: Harassment, Discriminatory Harassment, Sexual Harassment, Bullying, Hazing, Retaliation, and Reprisal. The long-term goal of PoP is to shift policies and programs to prioritize the prevention of harassing behaviors.

1. Introduction

Department of Defense Instruction 1020.03

On 8 February 2018, The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD (P&R)) published the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1020.03[1], "Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces." This instruction directs the Diversity Management Operations Center (DMOC) to ensure that the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI):

1. Establishes standards, core competencies, and learning objectives for DoD Component harassment prevention and response training and education programs.

2. Tailor training materials to Service member professional development levels and associated leadership duties and responsibilities.

3. Ensure training materials and curriculum include, at minimum, prevention strategies and risk and protective factors.

4. Review military department training plans for compliance with this instruction and sufficiency of content, and report potential deficiencies to the director of DMOC.

The types of harassment covered by this issuance are harassment, discriminatory harassment, sexual harassment, bullying, hazing, retaliation, and reprisal.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Guiding Principles

The basis for the prevention framework of harassing behaviors stems from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Public Health Approach and Social-Ecological Model. These multi-disciplinary models have been informed through the fields of medicine,

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[1] Under Secretary of Defense (P&R). (2018, February 08). Harassment prevention and response in the armed forces (DoD Instruction 1020.03). Washington, DC.

epidemiology, sociology, psychology, criminology, education, and economics[2]. Both models

have been applied to the prevention of violence (e.g., child abuse and neglect, youth violence,

intimate partner violence, sexual violence, elder abuse, and suicidal behavior)[3].

With parallels in root causes and manifested behaviors, adapted versions of both the

Public Health Approach and the Social-Ecological Model have utility in understanding,

responding to, and preventing harassment within the Department of Defense (DoD). Published

in April 2019, the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office's (SAPRO) Prevention Plan

of Action (PPOA) details an adapted model and framework tailored towards the prevention of

sexual violence. Since harassing behaviors and assault can share similar antecedents, it is

important that prevention models also be similar. DEOMI's Principles of Prevention, detailed in

Section 2, are adaptations from both the CDC and SAPRO's prevention models.

2.   DEOMI Principles of Prevention

DEOMI adapted the CDC and SAPRO framework into the Principles of Prevention

(PoP), which is a four-step problem-solving approach that examines both risk and protective

factors across multiple risk domains in order to develop multi-dimensional prevention strategies.

A risk factor is a variable associated with a higher probability of a negative situation or

outcome, whereas a protective factor is a variable associated with a lower probability of a

negative situation or outcome. Risk domains (e.g., individual, relationship, community, societal)

are different levels where PoP can be applied and will be further detailed in Section 3.

First, the four-step approach to PoP is detailed below:

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[2] Dahlberg, L. L., & Krug, E. G. (2002). Violence—a global public health problem. In: Krug, E. G., Dahlberg L. L., Mercy J. A.,
Zwi, A. B., & Lozano, R., eds. World Report on Violence and Health. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization:
1–56.

[3] CDC. (2018). Strategic Vision. *National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Division of Violence Prevention.* Retrieved
from: https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/overview/strategicvision.html

Step 1: Understand the Problem

The first step toward prevention is to understand the nature and magnitude of the problem(s) by gathering and evaluating data on frequencies and trends of the problematic behaviors. The data can be derived from climate surveys, focus groups, walkabouts, unit records, etc. From there, an Equal Opportunity (EO) professional should organize and analyze the data to understand what factors protect or put individuals at risk to be the offender or target of harassing behaviors.

Step 2: Comprehensive Strategies

The second step toward prevention is to develop comprehensive strategies by utilizing data-driven conclusions to determine improvements to policies, programs, and/or practices. These strategies should have attainable milestones with input and buy-in from leadership. Strategies can be divided into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary.

Primary prevention policies and programs are designed to transpire prior to problematic behaviors. Secondary prevention policies and programs are designed to immediately respond after the occurrence of a negative situation. Tertiary prevention policies and programs are designed for long-term responses to mitigate the lasting effects of problematic behaviors.

Step 3: Quality Implementation

The third step toward prevention is quality and effective implementation of comprehensive strategies. Quality implementation requires EO professionals that are well-trained in conflict resolution, risk mitigation, facilitation, and training development. Effective implementation considers the make-up and location of the targeted audience (e.g., number of Service members, ranks, etc.) and tailors the modality in strategy delivery (e.g., group activity, group facilitation, brief, etc.)

Step 4: Continuous Evaluation

The fourth step towards prevention is ongoing evaluation of implemented strategies. It is imperative for EO professionals to solicit feedback from the targeted audience and gather data on the effects and outcomes of the implemented strategies. This information assists EO professionals in determining effectiveness and identifying areas for improvement.

3. PoP Social-Ecological Domains

The domains below are based off the CDC Social-Ecological Model[4]. This model aids in understanding the effects of harassing behaviors and prevention strategies in all four levels (e.g., individual, relationship, community, and societal). The four domains are interconnected and nested within each other (i.e., individual factors can have effects on relationship and community factors, etc.).

Individual Domain

This domain considers biological and personal history, to include age, education, income, substance use, or history of abuse, etc. Prevention strategies would focus on providing access to resources such as education and life-skills training, would promote positive attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors.

Relationship Domain

This domain examines an individual's close relationships and social circles like partners, families, work colleagues, educational peers, etc. Prevention strategies would be designed to promote active group/bystander intervention, mentoring programs, or support networks or resources for at-risk individuals.

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[4] Violence Prevention. (2015). The social-ecological model: A framework for prevention. *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*. Retrieved from: https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/overview/social-ecologicalmodel.html

Community Domain

This domain focuses on larger settings like command climates, organizational traditions, exclusive groups, and unit environments. Prevention strategies would affect the social and physical environments. For example, there would be a focus on promoting inclusive environments through cross-cultural competence, reinforcing unit values and expectations and improving communication and accountability. It is also important to improving leader presence, involvement, and buy-in.

Societal Domain

This domain emphasizes broad cultural factors that affect climate like media influences, differences in norms and standards, large social movements, etc. Prevention strategies would be positive changes to high-level policies and laws. Within the DoD, it may be difficult for leadership to affect meaningful change at the societal-level, but leadership must remain aware of societal-level effects and their impact on their peers and subordinates.

4. PoP Seal

The DEOMI PoP seal depicts the importance of the involvement of all levels of leadership, military and civilian, across all the nested risk domains in order to effectively carry out the four-step process towards the prevention of harassing behaviors.

5. PoP Recommendations

While the CDC's guiding principles and models have been applied to a wide variety of health and social issues, DEOMI's PoP will be the first to apply these in the prevention of harassment within the DoD. Although extensive research has been conducted to support this initiative, it is important to keep in mind the following:

1. Harassment is a complex problem. The concepts within PoP are not all-inclusive due to the natural variance in personnel, duty locations, and types of occupations within the DoD.

2. The four-step approach of PoP is not linear. An EO professional may need to return to any particular stage when assisting a command in order to assist in improving the climate in the most effective manner.

3. When employing PoP across all risk domains, there will be cases where individual-level factors appear to play a large role in a negative situation. However, it is critical to be cautious against drawing conclusions and creating strategies solely based on the perceived Individual Risk Domain.

It is recommended for EO professionals to focus on risk and protective factors across all four risk domains. However, when developing and implementing strategies, it is recommended that engagement with individuals occur during community-level interventions (e.g., unit education, training, policies, etc.) on harassment prevention. Intervention strategies do not have to be applied directly to domains that have risk factors. Comprehensive strategies that focus on harassment prevention are often better applied to the unit that mitigates risk factors from all levels.

6.   Step 1: Understand the Problem

In order to understand the nature and magnitude of the problem(s), the EO professional must gather and evaluate data on frequencies and trends of the problematic behaviors. The data can be derived from climate surveys, focus groups, walkabouts, unit records, etc. From there, an EOP should organize and analyze the data to understand what factors protect or put individuals at risk to be the offender or target of harassing behaviors. These risk and protective factors vary with each type of harassment as defined in DoDI 1020.03.

The table below details some universal risk and protective factors across all harassing behaviors: Harassment, Discriminatory Harassment, Sexual Harassment, Bullying, Hazing, Retaliation, and Reprisal.

| Individual	Relationship	Community	Societal
Risks	**Risks**	**Risks**	**Risks**
• Stressful Life Events • Low Socioeconomic Status • Certain Minority Populations • Personality Traits • Perceived Weaknesses • Cyber Dependence • Sexist Beliefs	• Personal & Familial Conflict • Low Social Support • Gender Role Deviance • Power Differential • Negative Communication Atmosphere • Low Decision Latitude • Fear of Retaliation	• Demographic Faultline Theory • Flagpole Effect • Organizational Traditions • Poor Command Climate • Exclusive Groups/Units • Deployment Status • Unit/installation Size & Make-Up	• Media Norms & Omissions • Differences in Cultural Norms • Vague Policies/Laws
Protections	**Protections**	**Protections**	**Protections**
• Education • Employment Security • Acceptance of Service Values & Ethos • Cross-Cultural Competence (3C) • Job Control	• Inclusive Behaviors • Clear Personal & Professional Boundaries • Active Bystanders/ Social Responsibility	• Inclusive Environment • Community Resources • Leadership Engagement • Accountability • Education & Training	• Sociopolitical Awareness

Examples of Universal Individual Risk & Protective Factors

| Individual | Relationship | Community | Societal |

Risk Factors

- **Stressful Life Events** – Stress stemming from family, friends, or finances that lead to risk-taking behaviors or vulnerability to problematic behaviors
- **Low Socioeconomic Status** – Lacking in resources and opportunities that may lead an individual to be susceptible to offend or be targeted
- **Certain Minority Populations** – Minority groupings of race, gender, socioeconomic status, rank, etc. within a larger unit may be targeted
- **Personality Traits** – Certain aggressive or passive traits can make an individual more susceptible to offend or be targeted
- **Perceived Weaknesses** – Mental, social, or physical weaknesses
- **Cyber Dependence** – Overly reliant on technology or media, gain identity from social media, may lack social skills
- **Sexist Beliefs** – Sexist and traditional stereotypes for any gender

Protective Factors

- **Education** – More educated individuals may have more confidence in personal capabilities and be more willing to seek avenues for help
- **Employment Security** – Individual has a sense of purpose and security in work
- **Job Control** – Lack of fear in losing employment and can impact work policy/culture
- **Acceptance of Service Values & Ethos** – Accepting as guidance for behavior, won't be exclusive or tolerant of subgroups, active bystander
- **Cross-Cultural Competence (3C)** - Perspective-taking, empathetic, accept differences in cultural norms

Examples of Universal Relationship Risk & Protective Factors

Individual	Relationship	Community	Societal

Risk Factors

- **Personal & Familial Conflict** – Seeking validation outside of self or family and may not pursue appropriately
- **Low Social Support** – Lacking in help and resources from personal and professional peers
- **Gender Role Deviance** – Having hobbies or jobs that are typically for the opposite gender
- **Power Differential** – Differences in age, socioeconomic status, rank, education, etc. can have an effect on professional power over subordinates
- **Negative Communication Atmosphere** – Lack of trust and transparency throughout the Chain of Command, victim-blaming, and gossiping can lead to individuals not feeling comfortable sharing experiences
- **Low Decision Latitude** – Members are not empowered to make decisions for themselves
- **Fear of Retaliation** – Members may feel attacked or excluded if they report

Protective Factors

- **Inclusive Behaviors** – Team trust and interdependence, environment of acceptance
- **Clear Personal & Professional Boundaries** – Establish healthy boundaries
- **Active Bystanders/Social Responsibility** – Encourage a sense of social responsibility to aid others

Examples of Universal Community Risk & Protective Factors

Individual	Relationship	Community	Societal

Risk Factors

- **Demographic Faultline Theory** – Natural separations in any organization based on demographics, job functionality, etc. (e.g., groups separating for lunch)
- **Flagpole Effect** – Junior leaders may perceive to have more power if they are farther away from senior leaders.
- **Organizational Traditions** – Outdated rituals or traditions continue to occur as a rite of passage
- **Poor Command Climate** – Lack of enforcement in policies, poor communication, poor boundaries, poor leadership
- **Exclusive Groups/Units** – Holds values of subgroups higher than that of Service values/ethos, which can lead to hazing
- **Deployment Status** – Units moving to a highly stressful and less predictable environment, which is taxing mentally and physically. Hyper focused on mission with minimal time or space to relax. Reintegration to family and community is also difficult. Personalities and routines may change.
- **Unit/installation Size & Make-Up** – Critical mass is a population needed for a shift in culture

Protective Factors

- **Inclusive Environment** – Promote behaviors that are conducive to unit cohesion and morale
- **Community Resources** – Avenues of proactive support resources and acceptance of therapy
- **Leadership Engagement** – Understand dynamics amongst members within organization, show accessibility, and cooperate with other relevant leaders
- **Accountability** – Enforcing standards, along with appropriate consequences that allow recovery from mistakes
- **Education & Training** – Mind's Eye Training, which trains new group norms. Raise standards towards Service ethos.

Examples of Universal Societal Risk & Protective Factors

Individual	Relationship	Community	Societal

Risk Factors

- **Media Norms & Omissions** – Media portrayal of risky, sexist, and racist behaviors. Highlighting information that is out of context or failure to explain context
- **Differences in Cultural Norms** – Lack of perspective-taking and not tolerant of differences
- **Vague Policies** – Ineffective policies are open to interpretation or skewed

Protective Factors

- **Strong Service Ethos & Values** – Members truly buy into the guidance of Service values
- **Leadership Buy-In** – Leaders truly working towards a better climate for unit members
- **Leadership Cross-Cultural Competence** – Understanding different cultures of unit members can make for more effective leadership
- **Sociopolitical Awareness** – Important for leaders and members to keep up-to-date with advances in technologies and methodologies utilized by other businesses and organizations

EO professionals that have an understanding of risk and protective factors can better determine the scope of the problem(s). It is imperative to know the positive and the negative within a command to better define the goals of comprehensive strategies and the type of intervention needed. As mentioned, strategies do not have to be applied directly to domains that have risk factors. Comprehensive strategies that focus on harassment prevention are often better applied to the unit that mitigates risk factors from all levels.

7.   Step 2: Comprehensive Strategies

Once the problem(s) are identified, the EO professional should develop comprehensive strategies. A comprehensive strategy is measurable and can address or mitigate multiple harassment-related risk factors across various risk domains to improve to policies, programs, and/or practices.

1) Policies

   EO professionals play an important role in the policy process. They can determine if the root and presence of risk factors are due to gaps in policy or a lack of enforcement. In that case, research and analyses should be conducted to determine other, more effective policy or enforcement options. Then, when editing or developing new policy, it is imperative to incorporate all resources needed for continuous enactment, implementation, and evaluation. The EO professional should ensure adoption with education and training.

2) Programs

   Programs include resources available to Service members in and out of work. Within the work environment, the EO professional should assist in developing and facilitating access to leadership feedback, reporting, mental health support, etc. Outside of the work environment, the EO professional could provide information to community and base-relevant resources (e.g., social events, healthcare facilities, financial support, etc.).

3) Practices

   EO professionals should focus on training workplace practices based off inclusion and other protective factors. Education and training focuses on reinforcing bystander intervention, positive communication, cultural awareness, accountability, morale, etc.

Strategies can be divided into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary.

1) Primary prevention policies and programs are designed to transpire prior to a negative situation. For example, an EO professional could implement a monthly team-building activity to promote inclusionary practices and develop professional relationships with all members of a unit.

2) Secondary prevention policies and programs are designed to immediately respond after the occurrence of a negative situation. For example, an EO professional could provide access to support resources for those impacted and appropriately counsel the offenders.

3) Tertiary prevention policies and programs are designed for long-term responses to mitigate the lasting effects of problematic behaviors. For example, an EO professional better enforces policy pertaining to harassment with clearer consequences and offers continuous support to the unit.

Lastly, these comprehensive strategies should have attainable goals with input and buy-in from leadership. As mentioned in the PoP Seal in Section 4, the success of this entire model relies on the involvement and support of leaders at all levels.

8. Step 3: Quality Implementation

The third step towards prevention is quality and effective implementation of comprehensive strategies. Quality implementation requires EO professionals that are well-trained and adaptable in conflict resolution, risk mitigation, group facilitation, etc. These skilled professionals will incorporate modern, evidence-based methods of implementation that consider the make-up (e.g., number of Service members, ranks, etc.) and location (e.g., office, warehouse, deployed, etc.) of the targeted audience. From there, the EO professional will tailor the modality in strategy delivery (e.g., group activity, focus group, brief, online, etc.). Once implemented, the

EO professional should follow up with appropriate personnel or organizations to ensure adoption. Continuous human relations research is imperative to best remain up-to-date with effective strategies for implementation.

9. Step 4: Continuous Evaluation

The fourth step towards prevention is ongoing evaluation of implemented strategies. It is imperative for EO professionals to solicit feedback from the targeted audience and gather data on the effects and outcomes of implemented strategies. One effective evaluation tool is Assessment to Solutions (A2S), an overarching framework for the Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (DEOCS). This phase utilizes the Continual Improvement Process that focuses on determining effectiveness of implemented strategies and identifying areas for improvement (See Figure 1). It is imperative to utilize this process in the cyclic manner it is presented because even effective strategies may have diminishing returns over time. In those cases,

Figure 1: Continual Improvement Process

10. Conclusion

The long-term goal of PoP is to shift policies and programs to prioritize the prevention, not reaction, of harassing behaviors. In order to achieve this goal, a huge shift is needed toward being more proactive and supportive in the workplace to address potential issues early. Since the DoD is such a diverse and expansive organization, it is important to develop and execute a model that is both thorough and adaptable. The four-step PoP model is comprehensive in assessing problems, implementing strategies, and soliciting feedback across all domains that exist in the workplace, from individual to societal. With knowledgeable and skilled EO professionals employing the PoP model, policies, programs, training, and resources can be adapted to support the total force.

Appendix: Harassing Behavior-Specific Risk & Protective Factors

Section 6 detailed universal risk and protective factors that can apply to all harassing behaviors pertaining to the DoDI 1020.03. The following tables details some behavior-specific risk and protective factors that pertain to Discriminatory Harassment, Sexual Harassment, Bullying, Hazing, Retaliation, or Reprisal. These factors have less overlap in the different harassing behaviors than the universal risk and protective factors.

Risk Factors for Discriminatory Harassment

INDIVIDUAL – TARGET[5]	INDIVIDUAL – OFFENDER

•Demographic
  o Age–younger individuals are more susceptible
  o Gender & Race/Ethnicity-minority/multiracial women are most likely to be a target
  o LGBTQ
•Socioeconomic Status
  o Unskilled Workers and Laborers
•Personality Traits
  o More Submissive/Dependent/Passive
  o Reserved & Quiet
  o Low Self-Esteem
  o Conflict Avoidance
  o Overachiever
  o Unwillingness or Unable to Integrate into Society
	• Personality Traits[6]
	  o Lack of Self-Control
	  o Low Empathy and Perspective-Taking
	  o Negative Affectivity
	  o Unrealistically High Self-Esteem
	• Personal Beliefs[7]
	  o Gender Inferiority
	  o Traditional Gender Roles

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL

•Stressful Life Events
  o Divorced, Separation, Death, etc.
•Low social support
•Job strain & anxiety about future with organization
•Low decision latitude
	• Organizational Environment
	  o High demand on output
	  o Effort-reward imbalance
	  o Outdated or vague policies
	  o Negative communication atmosphere
	  o Low recognition
	  o Subject of conflict is taboo
	  o Exclusive units
		• Media portrayals of harassment or discrimination as acceptable
		• Societal norms that maintain superiority or inferiority qualities

[5] Tharp. A. T., DeGue, S., Valle, L. A., Brookmeyer, K. A., Massetti, G. M., & Matjasko, J. L. (2012). A systematic qualitative review of risk and protective factors for sexual violence perpetration. *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse*, *14*(2), 133-167.

[6] Pilch, I., & Turska, E. Relationships between Machiavellianism, organizational culture, and workplace bullying: Emotional abuse from the target's and perpetrator's perspective. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *128*, 83-93

[7] Bobbit-Zeher, D. (2011). Gender discrimination at work: Connecting gender stereotypes, institutional policies, and gender composition of workplace. *Gender and Society*, *25*(6), 764-786.

Protective Factors for Discriminatory Harassment

INDICATED – TARGET[8]	INDIVIDUAL – OFFENDER
• Education o Higher Level of Education • Employment o Senior or Middle Management o Higher Income • Values o Personal Goals Align with Organization	• Inclusive Behaviors • Cross-Cultural Competence • Willingness to Seek Help (without fear of retaliation) • Willing to Admit Wrong

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL
•Job Control o Influence over Job o Ability to Control Workload o Open Communication with Manager o Clearly Defined Career Path o Flexibility in Working Hours •Life Partner o Inter-married with Natives[9] •Inclusivity, NOT Cohesion (exclusive groups are very cohesive) •Focus Groups	• Leaders create a unit climate where members feel comfortable informing leadership of discrimination • Commanders investigate allegations of discrimination in a timely manner • Unit educates organization members how to recognize discrimination; and intervention strategies if observed • Unit conducts cultural-competence training to members to increase open-mindedness and cultural awareness •Commander provides anonymous channels to submit complaints •Fair promotions	•Invite local civilian organizations to participate in military cultural events to raise awareness for military and civilian communities •Publish civilian community events and promote military participation

[8]Plimmer, G., Proctor-Thomson, S., Donnelly, N., & Sim, D. (2017). The mistreatment of public service workers: Identifying key risk and protective factors. *Public Money & Management*, *37*(5), 333-340.

[9]Plimmer, G., Proctor-Thomson, S., Donnelly, N., & Sim, D. (2017). The mistreatment of public service workers: Identifying key risk and protective factors. *Public Money & Management*, *37*(5), 333-340.

Risk Factors for Sexual Harassment

INDIVIDUAL – TARGET	INDIVIDUAL – OFFENDER
- Demographic - Age–younger individuals are more susceptible to sexual harassment - Gender & Ethnicity Interaction[10] – minority women are more likely to be a target - Recent History - Traumatic Event or Life Stress - Prior Experience as a Target of Sexual Harassment or Other Sexual Stressors - Lack in Stable Mental & Physical Health	- Psychosocial Factors - Delinquency/Conduct Disorder - Gender-Based Recognition *Rape Myth Acceptance*—offenders are likely to hold stereotypical and untrue beliefs about the nature of rape and sexual harassment or assault (i.e. victim blame.) *Traditional Gender Role*—"old fashioned" ideas about how men and women are to behave - Hypermasculinity *Authoritarianism* *Sexist Attitudes*—beliefs that men are superior than women - Sexual Behaviors - Impersonal Sex - Multiple Sex Partners - Sexual Risk-Taking - Past Sexual Harassment Perpetration

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL
Gender Role Deviance[11] - Low Decision Latitude - Low Social Support - Job Strain - Family - Child Physical, Emotional, or Sexual Abuse - Exposure to Parental Violence or Conflict - Peers - Peer Approval for Forced Sex - Peer Pressure for Sexual Activity - Peer Sexual Aggression - Hypermasculine Male Peers - More Casual Intimate Relationships	- Organizational Environment - High Demand on Output - Low Recognition - Effort-Reward Imbalance - Negative Communication Atmosphere - Subject of Conflict is Taboo - Tradition - Unit Culture of Exclusion - Unbalanced Proportion of Men and Women in Units—higher likelihood of harassing behaviors - Size of Unit Overall *Demographic Faultlines Theory*[12] *Flagpole Effect* - General Incivility[13]	- Taboo Topic in Media - Differences in Cultural Norms - Societal norms on gender roles and female inferiority or submissiveness - Improvement needed on target-focused protection in policies and laws

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[10] Berdahl, J. & Moore, C. (2006). Workplace harassment: Double jeopardy for minority women. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 2,* 426-436.

[11] Berdahl, J. (2007). The sexual harassment of uppity women. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 92,* 2, 425-437.

[12] Lau, D. C., & Murnighan, J. K. (2005). Interactions within groups and subgroups: The effects of demographic faultlines. *Academy of Management Journal*, *48*(4), 645-659.

[13] Lim, S. & Cortina, L. M. (2005). Interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace: The interface and impact of general incivility and sexual harassment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 3, 483-496.

	• Perceived Organizational Sanctions, Sexualized Workplace, Sexist Environment
	• Unit
	  ○ Deployment Status[14] – women who were deployed reported experiencing more sexual stressors than women who are not deployed
	  ○ Installations on ships or deployed, or focused on training and combat[15]
	  ○ Fear of Retaliation
	• Sexist Environmental Context[16]	

[14] Leardmann, C. A., Pietrucha, A., Magruder, K. M., Smith, B., Murdoch, M., Jacobson, I. G., Ryan, M. A., Gackstetter, G., & Smith, T. C. (2013). Combat deployment is associated with sexual harassment or sexual assault in a large female military cohort. *Women's Health Issues*, *23*(4), 215-223.

[15] Morral, A. R., Schell, T. L., Cefalu, M., Hwang, M., & Gelman, A. (2018). Sexual assault and sexual harassment in the U.S. military: Volume 5. Estimates for installation- and command-level risk of sexual assault and sexual harassment from the 2014 RAND military workplace study. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR870z7.html. Also available in print form.

[16] Harris, R., McDonald, D., & Sparks, C. (2017). Sexual harassment in the military: Individual experiences, demographics, and organizational contexts. Armed Forces & Society, 1-19.

Protective Factors for Sexual Harassment

INDIVIDUAL – **TARGET**	INDIVIDUAL – **OFFENDER**
• Inclusive Behaviors • Cross-Cultural Competence • Willingness to Seek Help (without fear of retaliation) • Willing to Admit Wrong	• Inclusive Behaviors • Cross-Cultural Competence • Willingness to Seek Help (without fear of retaliation) • Willing to Admit Wrong

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL
• Inclusivity, NOT Cohesion (exclusive groups are very cohesive • Focus Groups	• Social Responsibility • Installations with more senior personnel or focused in support or medical missions	• Showcase effects of harassment within communities while protecting target

Risk Factors for Bullying

There are three broad categories of those involved in bullying and cyberbullying: offenders, targets, and those that are both, known as bully-victims[17]. Individuals who are bully-victims are typically the target in real life but take on a bully persona when online or with a different audience.

Currently, research has shown that individuals who experience bullying are also likely to be experiencing cyberbullying[18].

INDIVIDUAL – TARGET	INDIVIDUAL – OFFENDER

• Are depressed or anxious[19]
• Have low self-esteem
• LGBTQ
• Individuals with disabilities
• Bully-Victims are both offender and target—have even higher aggression and low self-esteem
• Lack social skills and unassertive
	• Two Types of Bullies[20]
	  o Socially Connected
	    ▪ Has social power and is well-connected with peers
	    ▪ Overly concerned about their popularity
	    ▪ Likes to dominate or be in charge of others
	  o Socially Disconnected
	    ▪ More isolated from peers
	    ▪ May be depressed or anxious
	    ▪ Has low self-esteem
	    ▪ Easily pressured by others
	    ▪ Does not identify with emotions or feelings of others
	• Both Types:
	  o Easily angered or frustrated
	  o Involved in verbal or physical aggression
	  o Think badly of others
	  o Have difficulty following rules
	  o View violence in a positive way
	  o Have friends who bully others
	  o Males are more likely than females to engage in traditional bullying
	• Bully-Victims are Both Offender and Target—have even higher aggression and low self-esteem

[17] Mishna, F., Khoury-Kassabri, M., Gadalla, T., Daciuk, J. (2012). Risk factors for involvement in cyber bullying: Victims, bullies, and bully-victims. *Children and Youth Services Review*, *34*, 63-70. doi: 10.1016/j.childyouth.2011.08.032

[18] Kowalski, R. M., & Limber, S. P. (2013). Psychological, physical, and academic correlates of cyberbullying and traditional bullying. *Journal of Adolescent Health*, *53*, S13-S20.

[19] Wang, J., Nansel, T. R., & Iannotti, R. J. (2011). Cyber and traditional bullying: Differential association with depression. *Journal of Adolescent Health*, *48*(4), 415-417. doi: 10.1016/j.jadohealth.2010.07.012

[20] Bullying. (2018). Who is at risk. *Stop Bullying*. Retrieved from: https://www.stopbullying.gov/at-risk/index.html

	RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL
	- Does not get along well with others, seen as annoying - Role Conflict and Role Ambiguity - Easily pressured by others - Does not identify with emotions or feelings of others - Perceived as different from peers - Over/underweight - Glasses and/or different clothing - New to organization - Perceived as weak or unable to defend themselves - Severely rejected by peers (*Social Exclusion*) [21] - Have issues at home	- Less involved in workplace - Involvement in workplace bullying - Leaders ignoring bullying or it is inaccurately perceived as training - Passive bystanders - Lack of policy on bullying and reporting procedures - Belief that aggressiveness & bullying are necessary to get the job done - Exclusive Units	- Consequences on Bystanders: - Afraid to associate with target - Fear of reporting bullying incident - Feelings of guilt and helplessness - Be drawn into bullying behavior - Feeling unsafe - Believe bullying is acceptable - Perception that bullying toughens up people - Job security - Competition

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[21] Taniguchi, T., Takaki, J., Hirokawa, K. Fujii, Y., & Harano, K. (2016). Associations of workplace bullying and harassment with stress reactions: A two-year follow-up study. *Industrial Health*, *54*, 131-138.

Protective Factors for Bullying

INDIVIDUAL – TARGET	INDIVIDUAL – OFFENDER

• Healthy Coping & Resilient Strategies[22]
• Higher Level of Education and Higher Income
• Make informal/informal complaint
• Know:
  o Your rights
  o Organization, Community, Social Policies
  o Collect evidence
  o Available resources and seek assistance
  o How to confront offender if choosing this option
• Say something to the offender, leader, friend, etc.
	• Encourage prevention of workplace bullying
	• Ask for feedback and listen; then make behavior adjustments

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL
• Peers are active bystanders and intervene and report bullying • Direct leaders and supervisors take appropriate action to prevent • Direct leaders and supervisors monitor create safe working environments • Direct leaders and supervisors identify bullying behaviors and implement strategies to change bullying behaviors	• Active bystander involvement in workplace violence and bullying • Anti-bullying organizational policies are clear and communicated to all employees • Organizational leaders enforce anti-bullying policies • Offenders and supporters of bullying who violate anti-bullying organizational policies are punished • Key leaders are involved in the development, implementation and enforcement of anti-bullying policies, training and education and responding to reports of bullying	• Organization members and leaders understand societal and local laws • Organization/Military Community develop relationships with civilian agencies • Organization members know how to use local resources i.e., local police, hospital, religious support, etc.

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[22] Slonje, R., Smith, P. K., & Frisén, A. (2013). The nature of cyberbullying and strategies for prevention. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *29*, 26-32. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2012.05.024

Additional Cyber-Related Risk Factors for Bullying[23]

INDIVIDUAL – TARGET & OFFENDER

• Location of Computer at Home
  o Higher risk for cyberbullying if computer is in a private room
• Intensive Use of Mobile Phone and Internet (e.g., >2 hours a day)
• Less Conscious of Risks Associated with Internet
  o Openly shares passwords
  o Talks to strangers, etc.
• Females are more likely than males to engage in cyberbullying

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL

• Increase access and use of technology coupled with less face to face interaction and feedback from associated cues leads to:
  o Less guilt as an offender
  o Lack of understanding of social cues
	• Screening for harmful content on websites and apps vary widely
	• Individuals can assume any identity/avatar of their choosing or remain anonymous
	  o Very prevalent in (and perk of) online gaming
	  o Poor performance could lead to harmful messages
	• Privacy and location settings are active on most social media applications
	• Applications that allow real-time streaming can show bullying, violence, and other harmful content as they happen with no censor
		• Culture of media and technology dependence
		• Increase in technology and applications allowing exchanges of suggestive photos or videos that automatically disappear after a predetermined time

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[23] Cyberbullying. (2018). Social media and gaming. *Stop Bullying*. Retrieved from:
https://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/kids-on-social-media-and-gaming/index.html

Risk Factors for Hazing

INDIVIDUAL – TARGET	INDIVIDUAL – OFFENDER
• Personality o Risk-Taker, especially for Social Approval o Over-Conforming • Gender o Men are More Likely than Women to Experience Hazing • Personnel: o with low social status in group/Rank o who are new to the organization o who feel the need to please authorities o who need/seek a role model o who deny fears and insecurities	• Personality Trait o Moral Disengagement • Has been hazed, watched or participated in hazing • Past history of being abused • Bullies and/or displays aggressive behaviors • Identifies with authoritarian figure(s) • Lacks empathy • Engages in activities that have no legitimate purpose • Wants to belong

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL
• Discrepancy in Status, Role, and Power[24] • Peers who stand and watch or participate in hazing to please authorities or fear of being victimized	• Large Group[25] o Promotes De-individualization—loss of individuality, self-evaluation apprehension, and self-awareness) o Diffusion of Responsibility—blame is diffused across group • Exclusive jobs or unit types (combat arms, pilots, submarines, special operational units, etc.) • Location of units • Organizational leaders ignore hazing acts or lack empathy • Anti-hazing policies are lacking or not enforced • Organization, leaders or groups justify hazing as "traditional-mandated obstacles to overcome as a way to force bonding" • Mission erodes • Maintaining status quo/traditions • Leaders who lack awareness or inability to change system	• Socially acceptable through media as it builds character • Culturally acceptable in organizations as initiation per traditions

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[24] Hamilton, R., Scott, D., LaChapelle, D., & O'Sullivan, L. (2016). Applying social cognitive theory to predict hazing perpetration in university athletics. *Journal of Sport Behavior*, *39*(30), 255-277.

[25] Cimino, A. (2013). Predictors of hazing motivation in a representative sample of the United States. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, *34*(6), 446-452.

	- Leaders who are protecting their reputation or the organization's reputation - Lacking organizational anti-hazing policies - No supervision in training or extracurricular activities	

Protective Factors for Hazing

INDIVIDUAL – **TARGET**	INDIVIDUAL – **OFFENDER**

• Personality
  o Resistant to Peer Pressure
  o Empathetic
  o High Self-Esteem and Self-Awareness—does not feel the need to belong in large group
• Know and understand organization's anti-hazing policies
• Report hazing incidents
• Associate with peers and friends who oppose hazing or do not use abusive language
• Question authority figures when something doesn't seem right or is not right
• High individual commitment, motivation, and morale
	• Personality
	  o Resistant to Peer Pressure
	  o Empathetic
	  o High Self-Esteem and Self-Awareness—does not feel the need to belong in large group
	• Develop healthy relationships with peers and leaders that do not participate in hazing or other illegal activities
	• Educate self on hazing and anti-hazing policies
	• Know the reporting procedures for hazing
	• Question inappropriate behavior
	• Report hazing

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL

• Peers/Leaders
  o Resistant to Peer Pressure
  o Empathetic
  o High Self-Esteem and Self-Awareness—does not feel the need to belong in large group
• Peers/First line supervisors who are not bystanders, but intervene and report
• First line supervisors monitor training and extracurricular activities to ensure no inappropriate behavior occurs
• First line supervisors promote group cohesion and team building and create a safe environment
	• Punish offenders and leaders who engage or allow others to haze
	• Publicly criticize hazing through policy, adds/posters, media and other available forums
	• Separate those who haze from the service
	• Deglamorize the use of alcohol
	• Conduct surveys like the DEOCS, focus groups, etc.
	• Conduct professional ceremonies like promotions
	• Communicate policies and reporting procedures
	• Listen to reports of hazing and intervene/investigate
	• Train subordinate leaders on how to handle hazing incidents
	• Have an open door policy
		• Organizations develop relationships with civilian agencies for sharing information and developing support/partnerships

Risk Factors for Retaliation & Reprisal[26]

INDIVIDUAL – TARGET	INDIVIDUAL – OFFENDER

• Demographic
  o About 95% of Reported Claims are from Women—much higher risk of retaliation
  o Lower Socioeconomic Status
	• Personality Type
	  o Revengeful

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL

• Employment
  o Administrative/Secretarial Position or Unskilled Laborer
  o Lack of Support from Middle Managers
  o Serious Wrongdoing from Peers
• Existence of gossip/rumors about allegations and complaints
	• Professional Workgroups
	  o High Levels of Segregation
	• Team members participate in retaliation and reprisal against those who file complaints or support investigations into complaints
	• Leadership displaying signs of reprisal, ostracism, maltreatment or criminal acts for retaliatory purposes
	• Unit cohesion is undermined and there is a lack of trust in unit leadership
	• Organizational climate fosters inappropriate behaviors that lead to harassing and discriminatory complaints
	• Increased in acceptability of sexual violence and criminal activity within the organization
		• The cultural norm of focusing on the individual, rather than the community

[26] Terpstra, D., & Cook, S. E. (1985). Complainant characteristics and reported behaviors and consequences associated with formal sexual harassment charges. *Personnel Psychology*, *38*, 559-574.

Protective Factors for Retaliation & Reprisal

INDIVIDUAL – TARGET	INDIVIDUAL – OFFENDER
• Personality o Resistant to Peer Pressure o Empathetic o High Self-Esteem and Self-Awareness—does not feel the need to belong in large group	• Inclusive Behaviors • Cross-Cultural Competence • Willingness to Seek Help • Willing to Admit Wrong

RELATIONSHIP	COMMUNITY	SOCIETAL
• Group of Targets Reporting Together[27] • Strong Professional Relationships with Senior Leaders • Position of Authority in Workplace Hierarchy	• Organizational Environment o Follows Through with Allegations and Reports	• Encourage culture of social support and understanding, rather than punishment

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[27] Wright, C. V., & Fitzgerald, L. F. (2009). Correlates of joining a sexual harassment class action. *Law of Human Behavior*, *33*, 265-282.